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Abstract: 
 Early work on the theory of economic policy stressed the importance of accounting 
for the interactions between fiscal and monetary policy. Tinbergen, and Cooper, 
taught us that there would be costs in missed targets, instability, and protracted imbal-
ances if this was not done. Yet most models we use today treat fiscal or monetary 
policies as if they operated alone. This paper reviews the advantages of recognising 
those interactions. We consider three possibilities: fiscal leadership (in the sense of a 
longer term precommitment), monetary leadership, and simultaneous decision mak-
ing, each underpinned by independence at the central bank. Temporal separation is 
important because it creates an opportunity for punishment by the follower (a result 
from asynchronous games). Making fiscal policy lead therefore provides fiscal pre-
commitment, and the best results for output, inflation and fiscal balances. In particular 
it ensures fiscal sustainability, without the need for arbitrary and easily evaded nu-
merical rules. We show these results are proof against override by rational govern-
ments; and robust to market reforms that flatten the Phillips curve, or globalisation 
and the changes in savings caused by the ageing problem. 
 
JEL classification: E52, E61, F42 
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1.  Preface 
This paper reviews the framework for setting fiscal and monetary policies in an ex-
panded Euro area. It uses a model that predicts that the present policy arrangements 
will inevitably face difficulties in enforcing limits on the use of fiscal policy, whether 
in the form of the Stability and Growth Pact or some replacement mechanism. But 
equally they will be unable to ensure sustainable fiscal policies, and hence sustainable 
public finances, if they do not enforce those limits. The way out of this dilemma is to 
create a fiscal regime based on debt targets, withdraw target independence from the 
central bank, and replace it with fiscal commitment to compensate. 
 
The key to these results is the implicit coordination that arises between the fiscal poli-
cies directed at long term debt targets and active monetary policies aimed at short 
term stabilisation; and then to use that coordination to manage the interactions that 
emerge between fiscal and monetary policies. Given that framework we show how the 
different policy-making institutions can retain different priorities, and hence individ-
ual policies that are internally consistent, while also maintaining a degree of flexibility 
that allows them to deal with problems as they arise. At the same time policy makers 
need to be independent of external influences, and short term political pressures in 
particular, so that their policies remain consistent in the pursuit of the goals that they, 
or society, have set for them.  
 
In the European context, this means examining vertical coordination between the Cen-
tral Bank, and the national fiscal authorities taken as a group. We therefore abstract 
from the horizontal coordination between the fiscal authorities (although section 4.1 
and footnote 11 show how they can be fitted into this analysis) because the focus is on 
comparing different vertical coordination schemes in terms of their outcomes, policy 
mix and ability to ensure fiscal sustainability
1. We reach four general conclusions: 
1) That fiscal leadership, of the kind described above, is the only regime that ensures 
long term fiscal sustainability.  
                                                 
1 Hughes Hallett and Scott (2004) show that the distinction between vertical and horizontal coordina-
tion is a natural part of any federal or devolved system of governance.   3
2) Fiscal leadership is superior to other coordination regimes with an independent 
central bank on other performance criteria. Leadership here means that governments, 
having created an independent central bank, adopt mechanisms that pre-commit them 
to a particular line of conduct for fiscal policy (say a Stability Pact with debt targets) 
and let the Central Bank deal with short run stabilisation. It is in their interest to adopt 
that regime. 
3) This finding is robust to changing behavioural relations stemming from globalisa-
tion and structural reform, or to uncertainties in those relationships, and to increasing 
demand or supply shocks. 
4) More unexpectedly, the advantages of fiscal leadership are jeopardised if the Cen-
tral Bank is given target independence in addition to instrument independence since 
the fiscal authorities will then pursue their own inflation-output trade-offs by trying to 
offset the additional monetary rigour with a looser fiscal policy – which means en-
forcing a Stability Pact will become steadily more difficult and an economic populist 
government is bound to emerge at some point. But the other regimes also face the 
same difficulty. So target independence is not helpful in any regime because makes 
the enforcement of fiscal restrictions more difficult and hence prejudices the sustain-
ability of public finances. 
 
2. The case for a change in the current framework  
Received wisdom for the existing European policy framework says that the Central 
Bank should be independent of outside forces (and of exposure to political pressures 
in particular), and that national fiscal policies should be left free to account for and 
address the particular circumstances within each member economy. The difficulty 
with this idea is that an independent monetary authority necessarily implies an inde-
pendent fiscal authority – which, in the European context, means a fiscal authority 
subject to political and electoral pressures.
2 That implies increasing demands for fiscal 
policy to meet the preferences of local populations since monetary policies (being 
common to all) cannot. Fiscal policy will also be increasingly set to reflect that popu-
lation’s legitimate interest in seeing that public money is spent on the goals, and to the 
                                                 
2This has the implication that rational voters will drive governments harder to achieve what they have 
been elected to achieve, even if that conflicts with the policies pursued by the central bank. See Dem-
ertzis et al (2004) for a formal demonstration of this proposition, and for an analysis of the economic 
consequences.  4
extent, that it wants. Again the electoral mechanism will be the force behind this. As a 
result, fiscal and monetary policies are likely to, if not conflict, be at least used to 
blunt the unwanted impact of the other on their own preferred targets. That will lead 
to poor and possibly unstable outcomes. Indeed, that appears to be the story of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP): it was first put in to rule out such uncoordinated and 
undisciplined behaviour. But under popular pressure, it was violated widely, as this 
argument suggests it would, and few counties now show any lasting commitment to 
adhering to it, even in its revised version. 
 
Something needs to change in the current framework therefore. We need to reduce the 
self-interest in the one-to-one (policy to target) assignments of the current policy 
framework, given that there is no one-to-one separation of their effects on the policy 
targets. That suggests we need to find a way to create greater coordination (or at least 
consistency) between the fiscal and monetary policy makers, without introducing the 
need for face-to-face negotiations over the precise measures to be taken in any par-
ticular case that could compromise the independence of the policy makers to take 
whatever actions are thought necessary in the circumstances.  
 
To do this we need to provide a less than exclusive intertemporal assignment of pol-
icy goals to policy makers – instead of the one-to-one “within period” assignments as 
currently imposed. The reason is that within period assignments mean that policies 
must compete to satisfy their own priorities within that time period, increasing the 
danger (or degree) of conflict between them. Each will end up trying to offset the ef-
fects of the decisions of the other, in a vain attempt to reach their own goals since they 
know they have no other opportunity to do so before the next round of conflict with 
their rival. 
 
But if there is temporal separation, such as would happen if fiscal policies prioritise 
long term expenditure goals and monetary policy concentrates on short term stabilisa-
tion and inflation control, then there will be less conflict and each policy maker can 
take into account the existing or predicted stance of the other. There is also the threat 
that an undisciplined (or inappropriately selfish) move by one player will be punished, 
and will be anticipated to be punished, according to the preferences of the other by 
subsequent actions from the other player. Yet each player gets their chance to imple-
ment their own preferred policies without direct opposition of the other. This implied  5
process of action and threatened counteraction, in effect a “negotiation over time”, 
leads to an equilibrium in which policies are better coordinated than when the resolu-
tion has to be achieved by confrontation. A convenient way to set this implicit nego-
tiation process in motion is to impose a debt target on fiscal policy making. Being a 
stock not a flow, a debt target implies a significant carry over from period to period 
and therefore forces a temporal difference (and a longer term view) onto fiscal plan-
ning not evident in monetary policy making. Also, being a moving total, debt is a bet-
ter indicator of the structural position of the economy than deficits which vary, and 
can be manipulated, over the economic and political cycles. But there is no compro-
mise on the independence of the central bank to make monetary policy as it sees fit. 
Similarly, there are no physical restrictions preventing fiscal policy makers from in-
tervening with the policy priorities chosen by the public that elected them. 
 
Fiscal-monetary interactions are just one example of where the interactions between 
the impacts of policies can change the outcomes from what one might expect from an 
analysis of the individual policies one by one. We touch on other examples here: the 
interaction between fiscal policy and the ability to carry out structural reform; or be-
tween labour market policies and social security, or between labour market reforms 
and supply side policies.
3 This is an old theme, but we are giving it new European 
clothes here. Both Tinbergen (1956) and Cooper (1969), in their contributions to the 
theory of economic policy, stressed that difficulties will arise when policies are not 
coordinated properly; and that the consequence will be increased instability, and a in-
ferior performance as each policy maker struggles to overcome the spillovers from 
decisions made by others while trying to get the best for his own targets within the 
given period. The result: larger deviations from target, more time spent away from 
target, and a slower return to target. Our framework allows better coordination with-
out any loss of independence for the policy makers. 
 
3. When is co-ordination among policies helpful? 
Co-ordination involves some form of negotiation or joint decision making in which 
policy makers choose their policies away from the policies they would have chosen if 
                                                 
3 Since structural reforms also have cross-country repercussions, the question arises as to whether a 
lack of co-ordination among supply-side policies (in R&D, skills and training, competition policy, etc.) 
is wise.  6
left to themselves and their own private interests. Coordination therefore takes into 
account the possibility that helping others achieve a stronger performance may put 
each policy maker in a stronger position to benefit from better outcomes himself. 
Likewise, coordination eliminates the costs imposed on others (in the sense of making 
progress towards their targets more difficult) by purely selfish behaviour. If each 
player can be made better off by eliminating the costs imposed on others, then the 
economy must be made better off. 
 
Exactly the same arguments apply to independent, self-interested decisions made by 
the policy making institutions (monetary or fiscal) within one country as they do be-
tween countries, perhaps with added force since their decisions will affect all markets 
rather than just those markets which deal in traded goods and foreign investment. Co-
ordination here would reduce the spillovers which the single minded pursuit of the 
goals of one institution would impose on the targets and policies of another. A tight 
monetary policy to maintain low inflation might cause larger output fluctuations or 
slower growth, for example; or expansionary fiscal policies designed to improve em-
ployment levels might cause inflation. Closer inter-institutional coordination would 
lower the incentive to create such spillovers, and hence lower the need for counterac-
tive policies to absorb those spillovers. 
 
Explicit coordination therefore involves a negotiated bargain in which the outside op-
tion - the point to which the participants can threaten to return if negotiations break 
down - is the narrowly self-interested, uncoordinated solution noted above. Thus bar-
gaining power, the inverse of how much one would lose if the bargain broke down, 
will likely determine how far each policy maker’s private interests are met in the final 
coordinated solution. To take place (to command assent), the coordinated policies 
must be incentive compatible: i.e. offer some gains to each participant individually, 
rather than just on average, over the best that each could hope to achieve in the ab-
sence of any coordination. 
 
Coordination will be at its most effective when the policy spillovers between econo-
mies and onto non-assigned targets are strongest; or where one policy maker has 
comparative advantage (effectiveness) in reaching certain targets with one instrument, 
and another has comparative advantage with another. In the latter case, coordination 
brings gains because it allows the reallocation of policy effort to those with compara- 7
tive advantage, even if that means making less effort at home with the (relatively) less 
effective instrument. Co-ordination is therefore most valuable when economies are 
structurally different (including different dynamics); and when the policy arenas in 
which the instruments are operating involve different transmission mechanisms, so 
that comparative advantage or economies of scale in policy effectiveness can be ex-
ploited more fully. Inter-institutional coordination is an example par excellence of this 
latter case. 
 
Harmonization is different. Indeed, harmonisation may not even be helpful because it 
does not allow comparative advantage to be exploited correctly when countries have 
different structures or policy responses. It is entirely possible that harmonisation could 
lead governments to enact policies sufficiently far from what would be efficient for 
their situation, such that the outcomes become incentive incompatible compared to 
what those governments would have chosen for themselves. If that were the case, the 
government in question would inevitably want to withdraw from the joint decision 
making regime unless its economy were identical to every other (participating) econ-
omy. 
 
These points emphasize that coordination will become important where there is a mu-
tual dependence between the targets of economic policy, and where there are asym-
metries in structure or transmission that govern how those targets respond to changes. 
Most often we think of these asymmetries as differences in the way that targets re-
spond in different countries; implying that cooperation between countries will be the 
key issue. But asymmetries also imply that coordination between the different institu-
tions of policy making within a country or currency zone will matter. In fact, it is 
likely that inter-institutional coordination will be the more important element. Hence, 
in Europe, to arrange coordination between policies operating in different policy are-
nas, for example between monetary and fiscal policies, or labour markets and struc-
tural reform, may prove more effective than greater coordination between countries in 
any one arena.   8
4. Co-ordination in EMU: which areas are relevant? 
4.1  Monetary policy 
If there are problems with monetary policy, they come from instability in the external 
value of the Euro; or from the asymmetric effects of a common monetary policy be-
cause different countries have different transition mechanisms or lack a common 
business cycle. The first problem would call for coordination with US policies and 
those in Asia. This lies beyond the remit of this paper. The second is a matter of how 
well the asymmetric effects can be compensated locally by more flexible fiscal poli-
cies, or by more flexible market adjustments. They are better dealt with under the 
headings of fiscal policy and structural reform.  
 
There is one further issue however: a common monetary policy is, strictly speaking, 
suboptimal because it aims to reduce the deviation of the average EU inflation rate 
from target, not the average of the individual deviations. It therefore omits any con-
cern for the variability or distribution of those deviations across countries. In an infla-
tionary period, those with below average inflation are penalised and forced to tighten 
as much as those with above average inflation. Similarly, in a recession, those with 
above average inflation must loosen just as much as those below average. The ques-
tion is whether policy would be better served if the differences in national circum-
stances were also to enter the policy calculations. One way would be to ask policy 
makers react to the variance and skews in inflation rates. A second would be to in-
crease the weight of countries in the pan-EU inflation index in proportion to their de-
viation from the ECB’s target (Benigno 2004). But the third and most obvious would 
be to ask fiscal policy makers to adjust their fiscal stance to compensate for national 
differences, expanding where inflation is below average and contracting when it is 
above. But that again requires coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. 
 
This need for extra flexibility at a national level could be provided by greater wage 
and price flexibility of course, in which case fiscal flexibility is less important. That 
shows structural reform may have an important impact on fiscal policy. But Europe’s 
markets are notoriously short on flexibility, especially in the labour market. Conse-
quently, there is a need for inter-policy coordination in those two arenas, similar to 
that between fiscal and monetary policies. If that is not feasible, a common fiscal pol-
icy at the union level with the flexibility to reduce the European cycle (so national  9
stabilisation is not so pressing), and regional deviations that sum to zero to deal with 
country specific asymmetries, is likely to be the best substitute.              
4.2 Fiscal policy and the Stability Pact 
The Stability and Growth Pact, introduced in 1997 as a means of restraining the mpact 
of excessive deficits and public sector debt on economic performance, has not been 
entirely successful. It remains operative on paper – complete with its excessive deficit 
procedure, sanctions for violators and surveillance mechanisms. But it remains inef-
fective in practice, for at least three reasons. 
 
The first is that it has proved to be unenforcable. The reason is that the Amsterdam 
treaty defines a country to have an excessive deficit if that country’s fiscal deficit ex-
ceeds 3% of its gross domestic output, and if the Council of Ministers judges it to be 
so. This leaves open the possibility that the Council of Ministers will judge the deficit 
not to be excessive on the grounds that the excess is either excusable, or mismeasured, 
or has appeared for reasons beyond the accused government’s control.
4  
 
A second reason why the Pact will remain inoperative is political. A necessary condi-
tion for enforcement – that the Council of Ministers declare a country to be in viola-
tion of the excessive deficit procedure – inevitably involves “sinners sitting in judge-
ment of sinners” since the Council will include representatives of the violating gov-
ernment and unanimity is required in matters of taxation and fiscal policy. Even if 
unanimity is taken away, there is little incentive for countries to vote to support an 
excessive deficit decision and sanctions. The accused have a natural incentive to work 
for a veto. Others have a natural incentive to use their veto, whether they have exces-
sive deficits or not, on the argument that “there, but for the grace of God, go I” or that 
“it will be our turn next, so a veto now will bring a veto in our favour next time”. It 
therefore seems unlikely that the Stability Pact, as currently construed, would ever 
produce a judgement that a country was in violation of the deficit rule and should be 
sanctioned – and especially if it involves a large country, too large to fail in the con-
text of the Euro economy. 
 
                                                 
4All too easily argued given the evident difficulty in estimating whether an underlying structural deficit 
is excessive or not, a necessary test to make this judgment (Hughes Hallett, Lewis and Kattai, 2007). 
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The third reason has to do with incentives. If there was little incentive for govern-
ments to keep to the Stability Pact in its original form, then there is no obvious reason 
for them to keep to the Pact after it was eased in 2005. Obviously they would find it 
easier to do so: but that is not the same as saying that they would want or try to do so. 
A violation seen as permissible under the old Pact can be condoned even more easily 
under the new version
5. 
 
Given this lack of an effective fiscal restraint mechanism, in EMU at least, it would 
pay all parties (governments, central bank) to agree to adopt some coordinating pro-
cedures when making their policy choices so that each may have the ability to restrain 
the other directly; and so that each has the means to threaten retaliation if there is an 
abuse.  
 
4.3 Debt Targeting 
Other solutions to the Stability Pact problem have also been considered – setting debt 
targets (a debt rule), a golden rule (balancing the budget for non-investment expendi-
tures only), targeting cyclically adjusted budget deficits, and substituting “soft” for 
“hard” targets. It turns out these options are too weak numerically to make a material 
difference (Fatas et al. 2003). Debt targets are an exception. They have the advantage 
of being a stock and not a flow. That implies a degree of persistence -- especially in 
countries with high levels of public debt. Debt targets can therefore be used to pre-
commit fiscal policies into the future, more so in countries where fiscal policies have 
been lax in the past, to a path consistent with the expected stance of monetary policy 
and the goals of sustainability in public finances and limited spillovers on others.
6  
 
In this paper I make much of the fact that fiscal policy lends itself naturally to long 
term objectives, and that this provides an element of leadership which can be com-
bined with independent monetary policies directed at short run (demand management) 
                                                 
5 The following can now be excluded from the excessive deficit calculations: public investment; de-
fence; development aid; conversion of pension funds to a fully funded basis; the costs of structural or 
market reforms; expenditures on European integration; also all deficits when growth is negative or be-
low potential, or where deficits are being reduced by at least 0.5% of GDP a year. 
6 To make fiscal policy follow a debt target also has a strong theoretical justification. Persson et al 
(2006) show that the optimal balance of fiscal and monetary policies will be achieved if the economy 
maintains a debt stock and maturity structure that exactly balances the marginal benefits of a surprise 
inflation with its marginal costs. The only question is whether superior results can also be obtained if 
only the debt stock is targeted, rather than the full maturity profile. The results in Table 1 below dem-
onstrate that they can.  11
objectives. That creates a basis for rule-based coordination between policy makers 
without the need for explicit negotiation. Each policy would be operating according to 
comparative advantage: fiscal policies directed at the goals of public finance, and an 
independent monetary policy to underwrite the commitment to credible stabilisation 
policies. The leadership element comes from the fact that fiscal policies typically have 
longer run targets (the sustainability of public finances, low debt), and are not easily 
reversible (public services, social equality), and are not easily used for stabilisation if 
consistency across time and different types of policy is to be maintained. Moreover 
any policy, independent or not, must be conditioned on the state of the economy and 
other policies. Improved coordination then follows because policies can be adjusted to 
reduce the expected constraints (externality costs) imposed by one set of policies on 
another. If the costs imposed on one policy are eased, then that policy can be relaxed 
which allows the first policy to be scaled back and not cause the externality in the first 
place. Less conflict and more favourable operating conditions lead to more efficient 
policies and better outcomes.  
 
However there are automatic stabilizer effects in any fiscal policy framework, imply-
ing that monetary policy must condition itself on the expected fiscal stance at each 
point. This puts monetary policy in a follower’s role, unavoidably. This is helpful: it 
allows the economy to retain the benefits of an independent monetary policy, but also 
ensures a certain degree of flexibility and coordination between the two sets of policy 
makers. The result is a Pareto improvement over the non-cooperative solution, with-
out any reduction in the central bank’s ability to act independently on its shorter run 
objectives. 
 
Second, we suppose soft targets would probably work better for the following reasons. 
Policy making is less likely to be disabled by arguments over the precise definition 
and measurement of the target, or the arbitrary nature of a numerical limit. In addition, 
soft targets introduce flexibility into policy making – so that the procyclicality of hard 
targets is reduced, along with the tendency of rigid targets to block reforms whenever 
the latter have short run costs. Soft targets can also accommodate the positive effects 
of a deficit, and the desire to allow differences in national priorities when simplicity 
and fairness suggest uniform limits should be imposed in the long run.  
  12
Third, we can expect debt targets to work better than deficit limits because they focus 
on avoiding the ultimate risk, unsustainable public finances. Moreover, a soft target 
version allows policy makers to trade off good years against bad (in effect, because 
the target is a stock not a flow, this produces a cyclically adjusted deficit rule without 
the difficulties of having to calculate the cyclically adjusted deficits accurately). 
Fourth, and again because the target is a stock and therefore persistent, a debt rule 
gives policy makers a greater incentive to obey the rules: i) to preserve freedom of 
action in the future; ii) to save for a rainy day at the top of the cycle and remain 
“within target” for the downturn; and iii) because the persistence in such a target 
makes it possible to create a reputation and credibility. A debt target therefore creates 
fiscal leadership by giving the policy makers a commitment technology with a long 
term aim and a slowly moving stock variable as target. The fiscal authorities will be 
obliged to set their longer term plans first; and we get the precomitment we need – but 
only if monetary policy follows (with a shorter horizon) to provide the threat to op-
portunistic fiscal policy making thereafter.
7 
 
Finally, to reflect the fact that we live in a world where shocks are becoming more 
global (as opposed to local or asymmetric) comparing different regimes with vertical 
coordination needs to take precedence over those with horizontal coordination. Also 
we should adopt a model that allows a shift in the mix of shocks: from demand to 
supply shocks to reflect increasing oil and food prices, outsourcing to emerging 
economies, or changes in demographics as populations age. To a large extent, these 
points motivate the choice of model and regimes studied in this paper: vertical coordi-
nation, pervasive supply shocks, and multiple interpretations for the model parameters 
(see section 8). 
 
                                                 
7 The results in section 6 and Table 1 show that this statement is true, but a formal proof is given in Li-
bich et al (2007). The proof uses the theory of asynchronous games, where each player can intervene only 
once in so many periods. If the length of commitment interval is different for each player, then the one 
with the shorter horizon can always intervene to punish the other unopposed in the last few periods before 
the lowest common multiple of their commitment periods (where the intervention cycle repeats and both 
are back at their threat point). This threat of punishment, without an opportunity to retaliate before the 
game is repeated again from a common starting point, means that the player with the longer commitment 
interval will become precommited.  13
5. A Model of Fiscal Pre-Commitment 
 
5.1  The Model  
The key question is: would governments ever agree to pre-commit their fiscal poli-
cies? Do they have an incentive to do so; would economic performance improve if 
they did? Can independent policy making lead to sustainable fiscal policies? Or do 
some regimes need fiscal constraints to guarantee the sustainability of public fi-
nances?  
 
To answer those questions, we extend the model used in Hughes Hallett and Wey-
mark (2005, 2007) to create a steady state dynamic general equilibrium model in 
which monetary policy interacts with, but could be undermined by, fiscal policy. For 
exposition purposes, we suppress the spillovers between countries and focus on the 
following three equations to represent the economic structure of any one country:
8 
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where  t π  is inflation in period t,  t y  is the growth in output (relative to trend) in pe-
riod t, and 
e
t π  represents the rate of inflation that rational agents expect to prevail in 
period t conditional on the information available at the time expectations are formed. 
Next, , t m t g , and  t τ  represent the growth in the money supply, government expendi-
tures, and tax revenues in period t; and  t u and t ε are random disturbances which are 
distributed independently with zero means and constant variances. All variables are 
defined to be deviations from their steady state (or equilibrium) growth path values, 
and we then treat trend budget variables as pre-committed and balanced. Deviations 
from the trend budget are therefore the only discretionary fiscal policy choices avail-
able. The coefficients α, β, γ, s, and b are all positive by assumption. 
                                                 
8 To derive (1)-(3) from a multicountry model, I have to impose a blockwise orthogonalisation to gen-
erate independent semi-reduced forms for each country. The disturbance terms may then contain for-
eign variables, but they will have zero means so long as those countries remain on their long run (equi-
librium) growth paths on average – all variables being defined as deviations from their equilibrium 
growth paths.  14
The assumption that γ is positive is sometimes controversial.
9 However, the short-run 
impact multipliers derived from Taylor’s (1993) multi-country model provide empiri-
cal support for this assumption (as does HMT 2003). 
 
According to (1), inflation is increasing in the rate of inflation predicted by private 
agents and in output growth. Equation (2) indicates that both monetary and fiscal 
policies have an impact on the output gap. The micro-foundations of the aggregate 
supply equation (1), originally derived by Lucas (1972), are well-known; and 
McCallum (1989) shows how aggregate demand equations like (2) can be derived 
from a standard, multi-period utility-maximisation problem. Both are derived in detail 
by Dixit and Lambertini (2003a).  
 
Equation (3) meanwhile is a budget constraint to impose the restriction that fiscal pol-
icy must be sustainable both politically (provide enough redistribution, public ser-
vices) and in an accounting sense (public debt must remain sustainable, a transversal-
ity condition). 
 
5.2 Two interpretations of the budget constraint:  
(i)  Social equity or income redistribution. 
Equation (3) describes the government’s budget constraint (Hughes Hallett and Wey-
mark 2005 give an explicit derivation). Different attitudes to redistribution are the fea-
ture that normally differentiates political parties and their fiscal policies. Monetary 
authorities, by contrast, are seldom granted the mandate or the tools to address issues 
of social equity or income distribution. We therefore allow discretionary tax revenues 
to be used for redistributive purposes, but retain discretionary expenditures for en-
hancing output
10. Both are deviations above (or below) their balanced budget equilib-
rium paths. But the additional uncovered expenditures can only be financed by creat-
ing money, , t m or borrowing post-tax earnings from the public: ) by ( s t t τ − . Since the 
former is the exclusive preserve of the central bank, fiscal policy will focus on the lat-
                                                 
9 Barro (1981) argues that government purchases contract output. Our model, by contrast, treats fiscal 
policy as important because: (i) fiscal policy is widely used to achieve public service objectives; (ii) 
governments cannot pre-commit monetary policy with any credibility if fiscal policy is not pre-
committed (Dixit and Lambertini, 2003a); and (iii) Central Banks, and the ECB in particular, worry 
intensely about the impact of fiscal policy on inflation and financial stability (Dixit 2001). 
10 See Hughes Hallett and Weymark (2004a, 2005, 2007).  15
ter as a contribution to discretionary spending limited by the government’s ability to 
finance that spending. 
 
We further assume that there are two types of agents, rich and poor, and that only the 
rich have sufficient savings to buy government bonds. On this view, b would be the 
proportion of pre-tax income going to the rich and s the proportion of after-tax income 
that the rich allocate to saving. Only the rich save, and only the post-tax earnings of 
the rich can be saved and lent; hence the discretionary expenditures available to the 
government must be constrained by the discretionary tax revenues the government 
decides to devote to redistribution and its public spending objectives. That explains 
the signs of t y and t τ in (3)
11. The tax revenues can then be used by the government to 
redistribute income from rich to poor, either directly or through the provision of pub-
lic services. This model therefore has output enhancing expenditures t g  and discre-
tionary fiscal transfers t τ . Both are financed by aggregate tax revenues; that is, from 
both discretionary and trend revenues. Expenditures above those revenues must be 
financed by the sale of bonds. 
 
(ii)  An explicit debt target. 
Now we take a different view. Equation (3) remains the government’s budget con-
straint. But we define b to be the current public debt to GDP ratio;  t τ  to be the reve-
nues that the government proposes to devote to paying down the existing stock of debt 
in period t; and s to be the proportion of any remaining increase in the debt stock (af-
ter transfers to pay it down) that the government expects to pay out in current expen-
ditures this period. It may not be obvious that a government could spend out of an ex-
isting, and hence previously committed, stock of debt. However we are targeting a 
debt ratio here, not debt itself.  If b=B/Y, where B is the stock of nominal debt and Y 
is the level of national income, then  Y Y b B b / ] [ ∆ − ∆ = ∆  where ∆x denotes a change 
in x per unit of time. But  t by Y b = ∆  since, by definition,  t y is the deviation of  t Y 
from its own steady state path. Hence  t by  represents the amount of additional debt 
that could be created and spent without the debt to GDP ratio rising when national in-
come rises or falls.  
                                                 
11 Since (3) defines the spending that can be financed, gt will be procyclical. Fiscal policy therefore has 
long run targets, but not a stabilization role.  16
 
We now suppose governments spend only a proportion s of that quantity, after taking 
into account the revenues they plan to use to pay the debt stock down. This is allows 
us to introduce a debt target into the government’s objectives, such that  t τ  is chosen 
to reduce the debt ratio from b to some target level, θ say.
12 The implication is that 
) by ( s t t τ −  represents only that part of the debt increase which the government plans 
to spend for short term stabilisation purposes. This follows from equations (2) and (3). 
The rest will be used for public spending, investment, structural reform, debt relief or 
other long term commitments. We might therefore regard s as the proportion of new 
fiscal expenditures going to automatic stabilisers (in the absence of discretionary sta-
bilisation), and (1-s) the proportion going to longer term goals. Hence we might ex-
pect s to be about 0.5 for the Euro economy (EC, 2002); or 0.33 for an economy like 
the UK (HMT 2003). 
 
5.3 Government and Central Bank Objectives 
We allow the government and central bank to differ in their objectives and priorities. 
We assume that the government cares about inflation, output growth, and the provi-
sion of public services (and hence the size and sustainability of public debt); whereas 
the central bank, if left to itself, would be concerned only with the first two objectives; 
and possibly only the first one. We also assume that the government has been elected 
by majority vote, so that the government’s loss function reflects society’s preferences 
to a large extent. 
 
Formally, the government’s loss function is given by
13 
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t y b y L τ θ
λ
λ π π − − + − − =                                        (4) 
where π ˆ  is the government’s inflation target, 
g
1 λ is the relative weight or importance 
that the government assigns to output growth,
14 and 
g
2 λ  is the relative weight or de-
                                                 
12 This shows that we are solving a dynamic steady state problem, not a period by period case. 
13 Multiple fiscal policy makers can be accommodated in this framework if they have identical target values for 
inflation, output and debt (Dixit and Lambertini, 2003b). That gives us the option to apply our results to a currency 
union (Europe), a federal union (US), or a regime of devolved regional governments (the UK). 
14Barro and Gordon (1983) also adopt a linear output target. In the delegation literature, the output term in the 
government’s loss function is usually represented as quadratic to reflect an output stability objective. In this model, 
the quadratic term in debt/deficits allows monetary and fiscal policy to play that stabilization role. A better expla-
nation of the linear term in (7) would be that it reflects the presence of monopolistic competition in the markets, 
which lowers output and which the fiscal policy makers attempt to counteract. It also captures the policy makers’ 
revealed preference for not saving for a rainy day.  17
gree of pre-commitment assigned to the fiscal sustainability or social equity rule. The 
parameter θ represents the target value for the debt or deficit to GDP ratio which the 
government would like to reach: hence  t y ) b ( θ −  becomes the target for its discre-
tionary revenues . t τ  All other variables are as previously defined. We take larger val-
ues of
g
2 λ , 
g
2 λ >] , 1 max[
g
1 λ , as defining a “hard” debt rule; and small values, say
g
2 λ < 
min[1,
g
1 λ ], as a “soft” debt rule. 
 
The objectives of the central bank, however, may differ from those of the government. 
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δλ λ δ π π − − + − − − − =           (5) 
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, and 
cb λ  is the weight which the central bank assigns to output 
growth. The parameter δ measures the degree to which the central bank is forced to 
take the government’s objectives into account. The closer δ is to 0, the greater is the 
independence of the central bank in making its choices. And the lower is
cb λ , the 
greater is the degree of its conservatism in making those choices. 
 
In (4) we have defined the government’s inflation target as  . ˆ π  To specify the same 
inflation target in (5) as in (4) is to imply that the bank has instrument independence, 
but not target independence. It is easy to relax that assumption and allow the central 
bank to choose its own target, as the ECB does. But, as I show in Hughes Hallett 
(2005), there is no advantage in doing so since the government will simply adjust its 
priorities (to give the bank less independence) to counter the unwanted lower inflation 
target. Hence, only if the bank is free to choose the value of 
cb λ as well asπ ˆ , do we 
get the extra advantage. That will be the definition of target independence in this pa-
per.  
 
6.  Policy Regimes 
 
We characterize the strategic interaction between the government and the central bank 
as a two-stage non-cooperative policy game in which the structure of the model and 
the objective functions are common knowledge. In each regime, the first stage in-
volves setting the constitutional parameters δ and  ,
cb λ  and the second involves choos- 18
ing policy values for  t t g m ,  and  . t τ  Unless the central bank is granted target inde-
pendence, it must accept an inflation target π ˆ  set by the government. 
 
We consider three different institutional regimes. The first is a benchmark in which 
there are no restrictions on the competition between fiscal and monetary policy mak-
ers at the second stage, but the constitutional parameters are jointly chosen by the 
government (or society) at the first. This we term “simultaneous policy moves”. The 
second regime is “fiscal leadership”. Here the government chooses both δ and 
cb λ  at 
the first stage, but the fiscal authorities choose t g and t τ  ahead of  t m  in a Stackelberg 
game at the second. The third regime is “monetary leadership”, where the government 
chooses  δ and
cb λ at the first stage, but the monetary authority sets  t m  ahead 
of t g and t τ  at the second.  In each case, pre-commitment has its usual meaning: policy 
makers face no incentive (would not wish) to change their policies to something more 
advantageous in the absence of unforeseen shocks. 
 
Each regime can then take two forms: instrument independence and target independ-
ence. Under instrument independence, the government chooses δ and 
cb λ as above; 
and the policy makers choose t m , t g and t τ  according to whichever game they are in at 
the second stage. But under target independence, the government chooses δ and the 
central bank 
cb λ and 
cb π ˆ (its inflation target) at the first stage, while policy makers 
choose t m , t g and  t τ  according to the relevant game at the second stage. Fiscal leader-
ship can also take a (third) hybrid form in which the bank chooses
cb λ at the first stage; 
but the government sets  π π ˆ ˆ =
cb  to ensure a measure of coordination. This is called 
the Bank of England variant, although several other prominent central banks follow 
the same model. 
 
6.1 The Simultaneous Policy Moves Regime 
In this regime, the government first chooses the parameters δ and 
cb λ . Then the sec-
ond stage is a Nash equilibrium in which the government and monetary authority set 
their policy instruments, t g and t τ  for the government and  t m for the central bank, 
given the values of δ and
cb λ just chosen, the inflation targetπ ˆ , and after the shocks  t u  
and  t ε  appear. Private agents understand the game and form rational expectations  19
about future prices and policies before the second stage: that is, before the policy 
makers implement their policies, and before the shocks are revealed, but after the pa-
rameters δ and 
cb λ  have been set.  
 
We solve this game by solving backwards: for the policy choices first; and then sub-
stituting the results back into (4) to determine the optimal institutional parameters δ 
and
cb λ . The details of this solution, and the related solutions with fiscal and monetary 
leadership, are given in the appendix. From the non-cooperative equilibrium at stage 
2, we get: 
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=                                           (8)
       
where        s γθ αβ φ − + =1       and    s βθ αβ + + = Λ 1 .                                              (9)                               
 
Evidently Λ is positive; and we can assumeφ  to be positive as well, for the reasons 
given in the appendix. In fact, numerical evaluations for ten of the more advanced 
OECD economies placeφ  close to unity which confirms that assumption.
15 Notice 
also that the demand shocks, t ε , play no role in this solution. 
 
Substituting (6)-(8) back into (4), we get an optimized value of the government’s ob-
jective function in terms of δ  and 
cb λ  from which the stage 1 decision can be ob-
tained. Minimizing again with respect to δ  and 
cb λ  yields two pairs of first order 
conditions which are satisfied by two different sets of values for δ  and 
cb λ . Both are 
satisfied when δ = 1 and
g cb
1 λ λ = . That solution describes an entirely dependent cen-
tral bank. However, it is inferior to the second solution where 0 ≤  δ < 1 
and . 1
g cb λ λ ≠ In this case the optimal value of δ is given by (A14) of the appendix: 
                    
g g g cb g cb
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δ
Λ + − − +
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=                    (10) 
                                                 
15 See Hughes Hallett and Weymark (2007)  20
Out of these two solutions, we can check which yields the lower welfare loss, as 
measured by the government’s (society’s) loss function, using (4). Substituting δ = 
1, , 1
g cb λ λ =  and (6)-(8), into (4) results in a greater expected loss (lower welfare) for 
the government than substituting (10) together with (6)-(8): see equations (A15) and 
(A16). That confirms that the second solution is the optimal choice. Independence and 
conservatism is always better if the government has social or fiscal sustainability ob-
jectives. 
 
The target independence version of this regime, where the central bank chooses its 
own inflation target and priorities,
cb π ˆ and ,
cb λ  is examined in Hughes Hallett and 
Weymark (2004b). It produces a different distribution of outcomes, but an inferior 
welfare result because the government retains the right to manipulate the value of δ. 
The only practical difference is that an extra term has to be added into each of (6) and 
(8), while (7) remains unchanged. It is easy then to check that this solution produces 
lower inflation, but reduces tax revenues whenever  π π ˆ ˆ <
cb . Since we must expect 
π π ˆ ˆ ≤
cb , this means target independence in this regime is trading less fiscal sustain-
ability for lower inflation. That produces an inferior welfare outcome because the cen-
tral bank will always choose a value of 
cb π ˆ  lower than π ˆ , but sufficiently close to it, 
to induce the government to choose δ = 0. That minimizes the bank’s loss function, 
but leaves the government/society’s losses somewhere between those for the optimal 
independent central bank and the fully dependent one.
16 
 
6.2 Fiscal Leadership 
In this regime, the government still chooses the institutional parameters δ and
cb λ . But 
the second stage is a Stackelberg game in which the fiscal authority chooses 
t g and t τ ahead of the monetary policy decision t m . But they do so knowing what the 
monetary policy rule for choosing  t m will be. The fiscal authorities therefore internal-
ize, in their decision making, the anticipated reaction function of the monetary au-
thorities. This time, the government and the monetary authority set their policy in-
struments, given δ and 
cb λ  values determined in the knowledge that fiscal leadership 
will follow. Private agents understand the game and form rational expectations for 
future prices and policies.  
                                                 
16 Hughes Hallett and Weymark (2004b), section 4.4, gives the exact calculations.  21
         
Again we solve this game backwards: for the policy choices first, then by substituting 
the results back into (4) to determine the optimal institutional parameters δ and 
cb λ . 
We get 
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where η is given by equation (A22), and φ  and Λ are as before.                                                                   
 
Substituting (11)-(13) back into (4), we can now get the stage 1 solution from a partly 
optimised expression for the government’s expected objective function. This part of 
the problem has a pair of first order conditions, which are satisfied by two real-valued 
solutions (plus two complex solutions which can be ignored). Both first order condi-
tions are satisfied when δ = 1 and
g cb
1 λ λ = . That describes a fully dependent central 
bank. However, it is inferior to the second solution:  . 0 = =
cb λ δ  In that solution, the 
central bank is fully independent and exclusively concerned with the economy’s infla-
tion performance. 
 
Out of these two possibilities, the solution which yields the lowest welfare loss, as 
measured by the government’s (society’s) loss function, can be identified by compar-
ing 
g EL  in (4) to the expected loss that would be suffered under the alternative insti-
tutional arrangement. Substituting δ = 1 and 
g cb
1 λ λ = into (4), with (11)-(13), results 
in 









g EL =                                                                            (14) 
But substituting 0 = =
cb λ δ , with (11)-(13), into the right-hand-side of (4) yields 
 
                                  . 0 =
g EL                                                                                   (15) 
 
Consequently our results show that, when there is fiscal leadership, society’s welfare 
loss is minimized when the government appoints independent central bankers who are 
concerned only with the achievement of a mandated inflation target and completely 
disregard the impact their policies may have on output.   22
 
The Bank of England variant. Many central banks in fact operate under an extended 
form of instrument independence: most prominently the Bank of England, the Swed-
ish Riksbank, and the Reserve Banks of Australia and New Zealand, who are free to 
choose their own priorities (
cb λ ), but must accept an inflation target set by the gov-
ernment. They may also face fiscal leadership established by fiscal constitution, budg-
etary practice or an override clause (Hughes Hallett 2007).  
We analyse this variant using (11)-(13) since the second stage of the game, as a func-
tion of the stage 1 parameters δ and
cb λ , has not changed. Moreover, since the gov-
ernment retains the right to choose δ, the first order conditions  0 / = ∂ ∂ δ
g EL  are the 
same as in the instrument independence case; while  0 / = ∂ ∂
cb cb EL λ  can be obtained 
by substituting (11)-(13) into (5) to obtain an expression for
cb EL . From this pair of 
first order conditions, we obtain two solutions: 
g cb
1 , 1 λ λ δ = =  is still one solution, and 
0 = =
cb λ δ  is still the other. Hence the Bank of England variant yields the same out-
comes as fiscal leadership with more limited instrument independence. In addi-
tion, 0 = =
cb g EL EL  holds as before. 
 
The target independence version. We now allow the central bank to choose its own 
inflation target 
cb π ˆ as well. This case is more complicated because reworking the 
stage 2 outcomes, (11)-(13), shows that the expression for inflation, (11), will the term 
in π ˆ  replaced by a new term which is no longer independent of the choice of δ. That 
means the expressions for 
g EL and
cb EL  will have an additional term in their respec-
tive inflation components. But it is straightforward, if tedious, to compute that 
g EL = 
½0 ) ˆ ˆ (
2 > −π π
cb  and  0 / < ∂ ∂ δ
g EL  at  0 = =
cb λ δ ; and that 
cb EL  and  δ ∂ ∂ /
cb EL  are 
both zero at the same point. That means the government will certainly choose δ>0, 
even if 
cb λ remains at zero, to offset the fact that the central bank would otherwise 
achieve 
cb ˆ π π = , see (A29), when the government is trying to achieve a different 
(somewhat higher) inflation outcome. That means the inflation outcomes will be 
higher, by (11), and the expected revenues lower than in the instrument independence 
or Bank of England variants. As a result fiscal policy and public sector debt will be-
come unsustainable, and the outcomes will be less satisfactory for the central bank 
(
cb EL  rises from its first best optimum of zero). Full target independence is therefore  23
counterproductive in this case, because the coordination between fiscal and monetary 
authorities is broken. 
 
6.3  Monetary Leadership 
If instead the central bank has leadership and acts a Stackelberg leader, it will always 
have the ability to select its own inflation target
cb π ˆ . But it may be constrained by sta-
tute, by convention, or by an override clause, in its independence and choice of priori-
ties. If that were the case, the central bank would have a reduced form of instrument 
independence mirroring the Bank of England variant above.  
 
If the government retains responsibility for δ and
cb λ , the game works as follows. 
Solving backwards, the Stackelberg outcomes at stage 2 (as functions of δ 
and )
cb λ are: 
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where µ is defined below (A31); and where  t m  is chosen ahead of  t g  and  . t τ  
 
To choose δ and 
cb λ , substitute (16)-(18) into the government loss function at (4) and 
differentiate with respect to δ and 
cb λ to obtain first order conditions for those parame-
ters.  There are two solutions that satisfy both first order conditions. One is δ = 1, and 
either  µγ β + =0 (ie  , 0 2 =
g λ so that γ β µ / − = ), or  . ˆ ˆ
cb π π =  But when 1 0 < ≤ δ and 
µγ β + ≠ 0, both first order conditions are also satisfied if 
                   { }
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g g g cb g cb
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It is easy to check that the government’s expected losses are minimised for any 
(δ,
cb λ ) pair that satisfy (19). And since any pair satisfying (19) is equally good, a 


















= >0 would 
be an optimal solution.  24
But, whatever the δ value, the overall outcome is no better than the simultaneous 
moves case whether the central bank chooses its own 
cb π ˆ or not [see (A35]. And for 
every δ value, it leads to negative tax revenues on average as long as
g cb
1 λ λ ≤ ; or 
if
cb π ˆ  lies sufficiently far belowπ ˆ . 
 
These tax results follow from (18), where we continue to assume  . ˆ ˆ π π <
cb  So discre-
tion-ary tax revenues are sure to be net negative (that is, tax revenues will be below 
the budget balancing trend in total) if
g cb
1 λ λ ≤ , but could turn positive if a large 
enough value of 
g cb
1 λ λ > were imposed; a feature that could be exploited under in-
strument independence. But would any rational government ever do so?  We deal with 
the danger of an override or a government bailout in section 8. 
 
Target independence. In this leadership regime, stage 1 requires δ and 
cb λ  to be cho-
sen from  0 / = ∂ ∂ δ
g EL  and  0 / = ∂ ∂
cb cb EL λ  respectively. The former is the same as 
in the instrument independence case; the latter is obtained by substituting (16)-(18) 
into (5).  
 
There are two solutions to this pair of first order conditions. When  1 = δ , 
and µγ β + =0 or  , ˆ ˆ
cb π π =  the central bank is indifferent to .
cb λ  But if  1 ≠ δ , the op-
timal value of 
cb λ  from the central bank’s perspective is: 
                                                    ). 1 /(
* cb δ δ λ − − =                                                  (20) 
Hence, with the permissible values of δ constrained to the interval [0, 1], 0 = δ  is the 
only value for which
* cb λ is non-negative. 
 
Unfortunately it may not be clear which of the two solutions will be chosen in this 
case. When the government/society chooses 1 = δ , we get positive values for 
both
g EL and
cb EL  irrespective of the value of
cb λ -- see equations (A38) and (A39). But 
if the government and central bank pick  0 = δ  and 
cb λ =0 respectively, we get 
g EL  
positive and  0 EL
cb = . The trouble is there is no guarantee that the second solution for 
g EL is less than (A38), although it is certain to be smaller if  π π ˆ ˆ
cb →  
and ). 2 /( ) s (
2 2 g
2 φ αγ λ >  In other words, the monetary authorities can only guarantee to 
get to their preferred solution if the government has a commitment to fiscal sustain- 25
ability, and if the central bank is prepared to set its own inflation target close enough 
to the government’s target not to trigger an override back to  1 = δ . If both players 
learn that these conditions in their own best interests, then both the bank and govern-
ment will get their most preferred outcomes. This solution then generates inflation at 
the central bank’s preferred target, and net tax revenues that remain negative on aver-
age. 
  26
7.  A Summary of the Results.  
The inflation, output and net tax revenue outcomes of all seven policy regimes con-
sidered so far are collected together in table 1. They all follow by inserting the opti-
mal values for δ and
cb λ derived for each regime, into the stage 2 equations for infla-
tion, output and net revenues under monetary leadership, fiscal leadership, or simulta-
neous decision making. 
 
Table 1: Inflation and Net Tax Revenue Outcomes of Different Policy Interac-
tions 
             E(π*)          E(y*)                    E(τ*) 
Money leads I 
(instr. indep). 
 
     α φλ π / ˆ
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cb cb  
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0
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Money leads II 
(target indep). 
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Fiscal leads I 
(instr. indep). 
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                      0 
Fiscal leads II 
(Bank of England) 
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                      0 
Fiscal leads III 
(target indep). 
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Notes: a)
∗ cb λ  in “Money leads I” is the optimal value below (25), satisfying (24) when δ = 0.  b) 
∗ cb λ  in 
“Simultaneous I” is the optimal value from (10) when δ = 0. c) The solution for “Simultaneous II” assumes 
π π ˆ ˆ <
cb  by an amount small enough not to trigger a return to a dependent central bank (see section 5.1). d) 
The inflation inequalities in “Fiscal leads III” assume δ to be 
small: { } { }
g cb
1 ) ( / ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ( λ γ βφ π π α η φ β δ Λ + − Λ − < .  e) These results assume
g cb
1 λ λ < , which is the case 
for all solutions in this table. 
  27
Conclusions on the need for fiscal constraints: 
a) Most important, all regimes have negative net tax revenues on aver-
age: 0 *) ( < τ E .The only exceptions are the fiscal leadership regime with instrument 
independence, or with extended instrument independence as in the Bank of England 
version.  
b) Since 0 <
∗
t Eτ  in all but these two cases, the other institutional structures will al-
ways end up increasing debt. Any limits set for the debt ratio will be exceeded even-
tually. And since revenues are lower, budget deficits will be larger in the absence of 
fiscal leadership. 
c) The threat to sustainability may not be obvious to the policy maker since those 
deficits could be quite small depending on the fiscal multipliers, sacrifice ratio (1/α), 
the savings rate, the commitment to sustainability, the priority for stabilisation, and 
the difference in inflation targets. Hence, a rule which restricts only the size of allow-
able deficit may not prevent the steady increase in debt that threatens long run sus-
tainability.  
d) This is why both monetary leadership and simultaneous decision making regimes 
need to have fiscal constraints imposed upon them if they are to be sustainable. And 
why those constraints have to be formulated as debt limits, not deficit limits.   
e) Fiscal leadership eliminates the inflationary bias of the other regimes, and results in 
balanced budgets (on average) without loss in expected output or output volatility. 
That implies fewer expansionary budgets and more effective expenditure controls. 
The ECB should find this a much more comfortable environment to operate in. 
f). These results hold independently of the commitment to the debt rule (
g
2 λ ), or its 
target value (θ); and independently of the government’s preference to stabilise or 
spend ( s
g, 1 λ ); and of the economy’s transmission parameters (α,β,γ). 
 
Results on which regimes are feasible: 
In practice, not all these regimes are feasible. The target independence versions typi-
cally produce outcomes which are inferior for the government, even if they deliver 
better results in terms of the central bank objectives and preferences. They would 
therefore be blocked by the government which still has the final say on the choice of 
regime through its initial choice of δ. If it finds that it can expect better outcomes on 
average in
g EL by reverting to instrument independence, then it will do so irrespective  28
of any benefits of target independence that may appear for the central bank in terms 
of
cb EL . 
By inspection in table 1, this happens for sure with fiscal leadership. It also happens in 
simultaneous decision making if 1 1 ≤
g λ (and possibly larger values). And it happens 
under monetary leadership unless α > 1 (which, as the inverse of the sacrifice ratio, 
will not be the case). We can therefore rule those regimes out as being those which the 
government, in its own electoral interests, would never actually choose when design-
ing the general policy framework. Appendix B derives the exact conditions under 
which target independence will be blocked in each policy framework. 
 
Results from comparisons between regimes: 
From Table 1, it is clear that the government’s objectives are better served by fiscal 
leadership under instrument independence. The central bank however may be worse 
off than in the other solutions, depending on how much π ˆ  and 
cb π ˆ differ. However, 
the simultaneous moves regime approaches fiscal leadership as the debt rule becomes 
“harder”: 
g EL →0, , 0 →
∗ cb λ π π ˆ t →
∗ , and  0 →
∗
t Eτ  as ∞ →
g
2 λ ; as does monetary 
leadership (inflation outcomes excepted). 
 
8. Extensions: Risk, Uncertainty and Structural Reform 
8.1 The Danger of a Government Override 
From Table 1, it is obvious that negative tax revenues could be overcome in the 
Monetary Leadership and Simultaneous regimes if governments could impose a large 
enough value of
cb λ as part of its instrument independence package: 
) 1 /( ) ˆ ˆ ( 1 δ π π α λ λ − − + >
cb g cb   and 
g cb
1 λ λ >  would be sufficient in each case. But this 
has to be done without reducing δ via (19) or (10) at the same time, and that will im-
ply a loss in performance. This loss in performance arises because there will be a dis-
proportionate increase in inflation if 
cb λ  increases but δ is not decreased as the opti-
mality conditions require, and (6) or (16) show. Similarly any increases in E(τ*) will 
fall short of what is needed. The point here is that any government under budgetary 
pressure may itself reserve the right to override the central bank’s monetary policy. 
But it cannot do so without cost. Fiscal leadership however, is protected from an over-
ride from a government in trouble since the outcomes from that regime are independ- 29
ent of 
cb λ ,δ ,π ˆ  or any other parameters which the government could influence. This 
demonstrates that fiscal pre-commitment is the key element in our results. 
 
8.2 Structural Reforms, Uncertainty and Volatility in the Tax Revenues 
Are there other risks in the form of uncertainty or volatility in the tax revenue streams 
that would cause us to choose one regime over another? This question is easy to an-
swer. From Table 1 we know that fiscal leadership, in versions I and II, is superior to 
any other regime with the same value of π ˆ . This holds irrespective of the parameters 
in the model; of the institutional and preference parameters; or of the uncertainty in 
those parameters. So whether they change because they are genuinely uncertain, or 
because they are poorly estimated, or because of a programme of reforms designed to 
increase competition in the markets, in wage setting, or to reduce tax distortions, fis-
cal leadership will continue to dominate. All that can happen is that the degree of rela-
tive superiority may increase or decrease, or the variability of the outcomes in-
crease/decrease. 
 
Second, uncertainty in the form of demand shocks, t ε , has had no affect on the choice 
of regime or its outcomes. But supply shocks do affect the variability of output and 
net tax revenues. However these effects are the same in each regime, so the ranking 
between them remains unchanged. For example we have, 
2 2 / ) ( α σ =
∗
t y Var    and   
2 2 2 / ) ( ) ( α σ θ τ − =
∗ b Var                     
in each case, where 
2 ) ( σ = t u Var and  θ > b . As a result 
0 / 2 / ) (
3 2 < − = ∂ ∂ α σ α t y Var , 0 / ) ( 2 / ) (
3 2 2 < − − = ∂ ∂
∗ α σ θ α τ b Var  and 
0 / ) ( 2 / ) (
2 2 < − − = ∂ ∂
∗ α σ θ θ τ b Var . 
That means both a flatter Phillips curve (lower α), as might happen with reforms de-
signed to reduce taxation or deregulate labour markets, and a decrease in θ, will in-
crease the uncertainty in output and tax revenues. So more ambitious fiscal targets, 
more ambitious social targets, and more flexible labour markets will mean more vari-
able tax revenues, and more unstable budgets. In addition, the worse the inherited po-
sition (b), the stronger is that effect. Similarly, any increase in the variability of supply 
side shocks (shortages in oil or raw materials, or financial stress, or simply the effects 
of increasing global competition) will increase the uncertainty in output and tax reve-
nues. But on the positive side, the volatility of the budget is less than the volatility of  30
output; and increasing flexibility in any of the other parameters does not play a role in 
budget uncertainty. 
 
8.3 Market Reforms, Globalisation and Financial Integration 
We now consider the effects of changes in the parameters α and s on the outcomes, 
rather than on the volatility of our different policy regimes. In particular, do reforms 
or external changes that affect those two parameters make monetary leadership more 
attractive as a policy regime?  We can interpret a fall in α in a number of different 
ways. It could be the result of transnational wage bargaining, or the effect of loca-
tional competition and globalization on the slope and position of the Phillips curve 
(Demertzis and Hughes Hallett 1998; Bean 2006; Pain et al, 2006)
17. Or it could be 
the result of reducing business taxes; or wage taxes if the price margins of imperfectly 
competitive firms are sufficiently sensitive (Bokan and Hughes Hallett, 2007). By 
contrast, reducing wage bargaining power, or employment protection, or hiring and 
firing costs, will have little effect on the slope as opposed to the position of the Phil-
lips curve. In fact increasing the degree of internal competition, or deregulating labour 
markets would eventually increase α.
18 
 
Equally we can interpret falls in s to be the result of increased risk sharing in a cur-
rency zone that follows from the greater consumption smoothing possibilities. And if 
consumption risks are reduced, then perhaps we should see a fall in
g
2 λ as well – a fal-
ling concern for the distribution of income. But if tax competition is rising, 
then
g
2 λ might rise because the low income/low skill population is at an increased risk. 
A more important point is that worsening demographics, implying lower pensions and 
greater health care costs, and possibly higher taxes in the future, would all tend to 
raise s – as has happened in Japan for example. Fear of globalization would have the 
same effect. 
 
The impact of changes in α and s are shown in tables 2 and 3. The results are mixed. 
Fiscal leadership (in either form) is not affected of course; its superior outcomes re-
main. Under monetary leadership, average inflation would almost certainly fall with 
                                                 
17Razin and Binyamini (2007) also argue that it is the result of trade, market competition and migration 
as markets integrate. But it could just be the result of greater credibility and effectiveness in monetary 
policy, especially with respect to controlling expectations (Roberts 2006, Williams 2006). 
18 Bokan and Hughes Hallett (2007) show how these different reforms change the model parameters.  31
locational competition, more flexible markets, lower taxes (lower α values); because 
2 ) ( s αγ  will be small relative to
g
2
2λ φ  unless 0 2 →
g λ  [and since  0 1 > − s γθ unlessγ  is 
implausibly large]. But inflation will rise with greater competition within the markets, 
or if there is no commitment to sustainable fiscal policies or social equity. Thus struc-
tural reforms that reduce α might make the inflation target easier to reach (because the 
loss in output gap is smaller), but at the cost of more volatile output and tax revenues. 
Similarly flattening α will lower net tax revenues; that is, reduce them on average as 
well as destabilizing them.  
 
Switching to simultaneous decision making produces the same conclusions under ex-
actly the same conditions. The lesson here is that increasing market flexibility or re-
ducing tax distortions on their own increase the lead of fiscal leadership; while 
stronger competition policy would reduce it. 
 
Increased savings rates would also not affect the overall superiority of fiscal leader-
ship.  But they would reduce average inflation under monetary leadership, 
unless π π ˆ ˆ →
cb  and θ  is small or
g
2 λ  large. And they make net tax revenues more 
negative unless  0 2 =
g λ . Thus higher savings (despite being used to strengthen fiscal 
policies; or to support social equity, pensions or other public spending)
19 typically re-
duce inflationary pressures. Under simultaneous decisions, increased saving would 
lead to larger tax revenues and higher average inflation because fiscal policy can be 
used more effectively to support output. The lesson here is that higher savings rates 
will improve monetary leadership (relative to fiscal leadership) provided there is some 
fiscal commitment, but have ambiguous effects under simultaneous decisions. Hence 
the effects of ageing will make monetary leadership look better, whereas greater con-
sumption smoothing would make it look worse. 
 
Finally, we know that raising 
g
2 λ  closes the gap between fiscal leadership and the 
other regimes. So an increasing commitment to fiscal discipline or social equity, as 
might happen if protecting low skill jobs from global competition is important, re-
duces the advantage of fiscal leadership; but increases it again when income equality 
improves.  
 
                                                 
19By section 6.2 these savings may be both public and private, even if they are used for fiscal purposes.  32
Table 2: Sensitivity of the Outcomes to Changes in the Inflation-Output Gap Trade-
off 
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Table 3: Sensitivity of the Outcomes to Changes in the Savings Ratio “s” 
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9  Conclusions: 
a) Fiscal leadership with instrument independence and an independent central bank 
provides a superior performance compared to other institutional arrangements that 
account for the interactions between fiscal and monetary policies. 
b) Only fiscal leadership, under the same conditions, will ensure sustainable fiscal 
policies and sustainable public finances. Other regimes will need a fiscal constitution 
to restrain those policies. 
c) These conclusions are robust to the behavioural changes that may emerge from 
globalisation, demographic shifts, and changes in the mix of demand and supply 
shocks. 
d) The advantages of fiscal leadership would be jeapodised if the central bank were 
given leadership or target independence in addition to instrument independence – 
which means that enforcing fiscal restrictions such as the Stability and Growth Pact 
would become more difficult and Sarkozy-like economic populism is bound to 
emerge at some point.  
e) These results show that the natural restraint on government spending under inde-
pendent monetary policies, where tax revenues reduce the savings needed to fund 
those expenditures, is not strong enough by itself to discipline fiscal policy makers – 
unless accompanied by the threat of monetary discipline and a long term fiscal target. 
In other words, there must be a no bail out mechanism to prevent expansions which 
push costs on others. This is important because the major challenges for the single 
currency evidently come from fiscal pressure, particular under conditions of slow 
growth, ageing populations, the pressures of globalization, and financial instability.  34
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APPENDIX A: SOLVING THE MODEL 
Given one of the two interpretations in section 5.2, we can solve for  t
e
t π π ,  and  t y  
from (1) and (2) to obtain the following reduced forms: 










αγ αβ αβ π                     (A1) 






t t t t t t u g m g m m g y β ε γ β γ β αβ − + − − + + =
−                        (A2) 
Solving for  t τ  using (3) and (A2), then yields 
t t t t t g sb m sb s m g ) 1 ( ) 1 [( )] 1 ( [ ) , (
1 γ αβ β αβ αβ τ − + − + + + =
−
    




t u sb g sb m sb β ε γ β − + − −                          (A3) 
This version of the model can now be substituted into the policy makers’ objectives 
given by (4) or (5). Optimisation according to the regime in question then provides 
optimal reaction functions for t m and t g . From there we get expressions for the ex-
pected values of  t m and t g ; and substituting them into (A1)-(A3) gives the outcomes 
for each regime.  37
APPENDIX B: OUTCOMES UNDER THE DIFFERENT REGIMES 
 
1) The Simultaneous Moves Regime: with instrument independ-
ence 
In this regime, the government first chooses the parameters δ and 
cb λ . Then, in a sec-
ond stage, the government and monetary authority set their policy instruments, 
t g and t τ  for the government and  t m  for the central bank, in a Nash equilibrium given 
the values of δ and 
cb λ  just chosen and a common inflation target π ˆ . Private agents 
understand the game and form rational expectations about future prices and policies 
before the second stage: that is, before the policy makers implement their policies, but 
after the institutional parameters δ and 
cb λ  have been set. The policy game therefore 
takes the form: 
 
Stage 1 
The government solves the problem: 
 
        { } )] , ( [ ] ˆ ) , ( [ 2





t t t t t t
cb
t t
g m g y m g E m g EL
cb λ π π λ δ
λ δ
− − =             
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t t t t t t
g
m g m g y b E τ θ
λ
− − +                       (A4)                                
where ) , , , (
cb
t t
g m g L λ δ  is (4) evaluated at  (
cb
t t m g λ δ, , , ), and E denotes expecta-
tions. 
 
Stage 2     
1.  Private agents form rational expectations about future prices 
e
t π from (A1), be-
fore the shocks  t u  and  t ε   are realized. 
2.  The shocks  t u  and  t ε  are realized and observed by the government and by the    
central bank. 
3.  The government chooses t g , taking  t m  as given, to minimize   
) , , , (
cb
t t
g m g L λ δ  where δ and 
cb λ denote the values determined at stage 1. 
4.  At the same time, the central bank chooses  t m , taking  t g  as given, to mini-
mize 
        )] , ( [ ) 1 ( ] ˆ ) , ( [
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We solve this game by solving backwards: for the policy choices (stage 2) first; and 
then substituting the results back into (A4) to determine the optimal institutional pa-
rameters δ and
cb λ . From the Nash equilibrium at stage 2, we get  38
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where         s γθ αβ φ − + =1  ,                                                                                   (A9) 
 
and             s βθ αβ + + = Λ 1 .                                                                                 (A10) 
 
Evidently Λ is positive. We assumeφ  to be positive as well. One should expect φ >0 
since, with θ<1 and s<1, fiscal policy would otherwise have to have such a strong im-
pact on national income that, together with a Phillips curve that is sufficiently flat and 
weak monetary transmissions, government expenditures would be able to simultane-
ously boost output and be transferred to pay debt down without worsening the budget 
or debt ratios at the same time. That would require a fiscal policy multiplier of 
γ>(1+αβ)/(θs). In fact, with s ≈ 0.5 (section 5.2) and debt target of 50% of GDP, it 
would require fiscal multipliers in excess of 4 or 5. This is hardly plausible; and nu-
merical evaluations for ten of the larger OECD economies placeφ  close to unity. 
Nevertheless, in order to getφ <0, output would have to be capable of growing fast 
enough to generate sufficient revenues to boost output when needed and to pay down 
the debt. If that is not possible, then one must to come at the expense of the other.  
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Since , 0 ≠ Λ +δγ βφ this part of the problem has two first order conditions: 
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cb g s λ λ β α γ δ                                                    (A13)
          
There are two sets of values for δ  and 
cb λ which satisfy this pair of first-order condi-
tions. The first solution is δ = 1 and
g cb
1 λ λ = . That solution describes an entirely de-
pendent central bank. However, it is inferior to the second solution where 0 ≤ δ < 
1,
g cb
1 λ λ ≠  and 
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Out of these two possibilities, we can check which yields the lowest welfare loss by 
evaluating (A11) under the two alternative solutions. Substituting δ = 1 and 
g cb
1 λ λ =  
into (A11) results in 








g EL =                                                                          (A15) 
But substituting (A14) into the right-hand-side of (A11) yields 
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For positive values of 
g
2 λ  the value of (A15) is greater than (A16). 
 
Target independence: Here the central bank chooses its own inflation target and pri-
orities,
cb π ˆ and .
cb λ It produces a different distribution of outcomes, but an inferior 
welfare result because the government retains the right to manipulate the value of δ. 
The only difference is that the terms 
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π π δ αβγ
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        (A17) 
need to be added into (6) and (8) respectively, while (7) remains unchanged. It is easy 
to check that this solution produces lower inflation, but reduces tax revenues when 
π π ˆ ˆ <
cb . The inferior welfare outcome then follows because the central bank will al-
ways choose a value of 
cb π ˆ  lower than π ˆ , but sufficiently close to it, to make the  40
government to choose δ = 0. That minimizes the bank’s loss function, but leaves the 
government/society’s losses somewhere between (A15) and (A16).
20 
 
2) Fiscal Leadership: with instrument independence. 
In this regime, the government still chooses the institutional parameters δ and
cb λ . But 
the second stage is a Stackelberg game in which fiscal policy takes on a leadership 
role. In that stage, the government and the monetary authority set their policy instru-
ments, given δ and 




The government solves the problem: 
 
        { } )] , ( [ ] ˆ ) , ( [ 2









g m g y m g E m g EL
cb λ π π λ δ
λ δ
− − =             
             
2 2 )] , ( ) , ( ) [(
2
t t t t t t
g
m g m g y b E τ θ
λ
− − +                     (A18)                         
where  ) , , , (
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t t
g m g L λ δ  is (4) evaluated at (
cb
t t m g λ δ, , , ), and E denotes expecta-
tions. 
Stage 2     
5.  Private agents form rational expectations about future prices 
e
t π  before the 
shocks  t u  and  t ε   are realized. 
6.  The shocks  t u  and  t ε  are realized and observed by the government and by the    
central bank. 
7.  The government chooses t g , before  t m  is chosen by the central bank, to 
minimize   ) , , , (
cb
t t
g m g L λ δ  where δ and 
cb λ are at the values determined at 
stage 1. 
8.  The central bank then chooses  t m , taking  t g  as given, to minimize 
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We solve this game backwards: for the policy choices (stage 2) first; and then substi-
tuting the results back into (A18) to determine the optimal institutional parameters δ 
and 
cb λ . From stage 2, we get 
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20 Hughes Hallett and Weymark (2004b), section 4.4, gives the exact calculations.  41
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with        s γθ αβ φ − + =1    and    s βθ αβ + + = Λ 1  as before.  
                                  
Substituting (A19)-(A21) back into (A17), we can now get the stage 1 solution from: 
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This part of the problem has two first order conditions: 
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where . / δ η ∂ ∂ = Ω    There are two real-valued solutions which satisfy this pair of 
first-order conditions.
21 Both are satisfied when δ = 1 and
g cb
1 λ λ = . That solution de-
scribes a fully dependent central bank. However, it is inferior to the second solution: 
. 0 = =
cb λ δ  In that solution, the central bank is fully independent and exclusively 
concerned with the economy’s inflation performance. 
 
Out of these two possibilities, the solution which yields the lowest welfare loss, as 
measured by the government’s (society’s) loss function, can be identified by compar-
ing (A23) to the losses to be expected under the alternative arrangement. Substituting 
δ = 1 and 
g cb
1 λ λ = into (A23) results in 
                                                 
21 Because η is a function of δ, (A25) is quartic in δ. This polynomial has four distinct roots, of which 
only two are real-valued. For the complete solution, see Hughes Hallett and Weymark (2004b). Note 
that βφ+γΛ, φ-ηΛ, Ω, and βη+γ are all positive if φ > 0, with the exception of βη+γ which is zero when 
δ =0.  42









g EL =                                                                          (A26) 
But substituting  0 = =
cb λ δ into the right-hand-side of (A23) yields 
                                  . 0 =
g EL                                                                                 (A27) 
 
Consequently, under fiscal leadership, society’s welfare losses are minimized when 
the government appoints independent central bankers who are concerned only with 
the achievement of a mandated inflation target and disregard their on output.  
 
The Bank of England variant: We can analyse this regime using (A19)-(A21) since 
the second stage of the game as a function of δ and
cb λ is unchanged. Moreover, since 
the government retains the right to choose δ, the first order conditions for the first 
stage are (A25) for  0 / = ∂ ∂ δ
g EL ; and  0 / = ∂ ∂
cb cb EL λ  can be obtained from 
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λ γ βη δ η φ β
γ βη β δ
λ γ βη δ η φ β
λ λ γ βη β δ
δλ .     (A28) 
Notice that
g cb
1 , 1 λ λ δ = = is still one solution; and that  0 = =
cb λ δ  is still the other. 
That in turn implies the same outcomes as in fiscal leadership with instrument inde-
pendence. 
 
Target independence: We now allow the central bank to choose its own inflation 
target 
cb π ˆ . This case is more complicated because reworking the stage 2 outcomes, 
(14)-(16), shows that the expression for π in (14) has the π ˆ  term replaced by 
                                  
) ( ) (
ˆ ) ( ˆ ) (
γ βη δ η φ β
π γ βη δ π η φ β
π
+ Λ + Λ −
+ Λ + Λ −
=
cb
                                     (A29) 
which is not independent of the choice of δ. That means the expressions 
for
g EL and
cb EL  will have the additional terms of  43
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  and  
) ( ) (
) ˆ ˆ )( ( ˆ
γ βη δ η φ β
π π γ βη δ
π π
+ Λ + Λ −
− + Λ −
= −
cb
cb      
in their respective inflation components. From here it is straightforward, but tedious, 
to show that 
g EL = ½ 0 ) ˆ ˆ (
2 > −π π
cb  and  0 / < ∂ ∂ δ
g EL  at  0 = =
cb λ δ ; and also that 
cb EL  and  δ ∂ ∂ /
cb EL  are both zero at that point. Hence the government will certainly 
choose δ>0, even if 
cb λ remains at zero, to offset the fact that the central bank would 
otherwise achieve , ˆ
cb π π = see (A29), while the government is trying to achieve a dif-
ferent (higher) inflation outcome. That means inflation outcomes will be higher, by 
(11) and (A22), and expected revenues lower, than in the instrument independence or 
Bank of England variants. As a result fiscal policy will become unsustainable, and the 
outcomes less satisfactory for the central bank (
cb EL  rises from its first best optimum 
of zero). 
 
3) Monetary Leadership: with instrument independence 
If the central bank has leadership and acts a Stackelberg leader, it will always be able 
to select the inflation target 
cb π ˆ for its own decision rule. If the government retains 
responsibility for δ and
cb λ , the game then works as follows: 
Stage 1 
The government solves the problem: 
 
        { } )] , ( [ ] ˆ ) , ( [ 2









g m g y m g E m g EL
cb λ π π λ δ
λ δ
− − =             
             
2 2 )] , ( ) , ( ) [(
2
t t t t t t
g
m g m g y b E τ θ
λ
− − +                          
where ) , , , (
cb
t t
g m g L λ δ  is (4) evaluated at  (
cb
t t m g λ δ, , , ), and E denotes expecta-
tions. 
 
Stage 2     
9.  Private agents form rational expectations about future prices 
e
t π  before the 
shocks  t u  and  t ε   are realized. 
10. The shocks  t u  and  t ε  are realized and observed by the government and by the    
central bank. 
11. The central bank chooses t m , before  t g  is chosen by the government, to 
minimize   ) , , , (
cb
t t
cb m g L λ δ  where δ and 
cb λ are at the values determined at 
stage 1. 
12. The government chooses t g , taking  t m  as given, to minimise 
) , , , (
cb
t t
g m g L λ δ . 
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Solving backwards, the reduced form outcomes at stage 2 (as functions of δ 
and )
cb λ are: 
)] ( ) [(
) ( ) )( 1 (
) ( ) (
ˆ ) ( ˆ ) (
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1
µφ δγ µγ β α
λ γ βφ δ φλ µγ β δ
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where  ,
2











λ φ γ α







= and φ  and Λare as before. 
 
To choose δ and 
cb λ , substitute (A30)-(A32) into the government loss function (4) 
and differentiate with respect to δ and 
cb λ to obtain first order conditions for those pa-
rameters: 
 
         { }
g cb cb g
1 2 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ( λ γ βφ δ λ δ φ π π φ µγ β α ϕλ Λ + + Γ − + − + ΓΣ  
                                        { } 0 ) )( 1 ( ) ˆ ˆ ( 1
2 2 2 2 = − − + − Σ Γ +
g cb cb s λ λ δ π π α γ α         (A33) 
and   { }
g cb cb g
1 2 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ) 1 ( λ γ βφ δ λ δ φ π π φ α φλ δ Λ + + Γ − + − Γ −  
                                          { } 0 ) )( 1 ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ) 1 ( 1
2 2 2 = − − + − − Γ +
g cb cb s λ λ δ π π α δ γ α   (A34) 
respectively, where  ) ( µγ β + = Γ  and 
). )( ˆ ˆ ( ) )( (
cb cb g
1 µφ Λ π π αγ λ λ Λ γ βφ Σ − − + − + =  
Two solutions satisfy both (A33) and (A34). One is δ = 1,  and  either  0 = Γ (ie 
, 0 2 =
g λ so ) /γ β µ − = ; or  . ˆ ˆ
cb π π =  But when 1 0 < ≤ δ and Γ ≠ 0, (A33) and (A34) 
are also satisfied  
 If  { }
{}
g g g cb g cb
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δ
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− + + − + +
=         (A35)  45
The government’s expected losses are now minimised for any (δ,
cb λ ) pair that satisfy 
(A34). Substituting back into (A30)-(A32) and the result in (4), yields that minimum 
as:
22  



























.                                         (A36) 
Since any pair satisfying (A35) is equally good, one solution would be a fully inde-


















= >0. But, whatever 
the value of δ, (A36) is no better than the simultaneous moves case whether the cen-
tral bank chooses its own 
cb π ˆ or not. And it also leads to negative tax revenues on av-
erage as long as
g cb
1 λ λ ≤ ; or if
cb π ˆ  lies belowπ ˆ  but sufficiently far 
away, . / ) )( 1 ( ˆ ˆ 1 α λ λ δ π π
g cb cb − − ≥ −  
 
Target independence: In this version, the stage 1 parameters, δ and
cb λ , must be cho-
sen from  0 / = ∂ ∂ δ
g EL  and  0 / = ∂ ∂
cb cb EL λ  respectively. The former is given by 
(A32); and the latter by substituting (A30)-(A32) into (5). The first order condition 
from the latter is 
 
{ }
g cb cb g
1 2 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ˆ ˆ )( ( ) 1 ( λ γ βφ δ λ δ φ π π µφ δαγ φλ δ Λ + + Γ − + − − Λ −  
                                         . 0 ) )( 1 ( ) ˆ ˆ ( )[ 1 ( ) ( 1
2 = − − + − − −
cb g cb s λ λ δ π π α δ δ αγ       (A37) 
 
There are two possible solutions to this pair of first order conditions. One is when 
1 = δ , and either Γ = 0 or  . ˆ ˆ π π =
cb  The central bank is indifferent about
cb λ in this 
case. But if  1 ≠ δ , the optimal value of 
cb λ for the central bank is given by: 
                                                    ). 1 /(
* cb δ δ λ − − =                                                  (A38) 
With the permissible range for δ constrained to [0, 1], the only value for which
* cb λ is 
non-negative is 0 = δ . 
 
Unfortunately it is not always clear which of the two solutions will be chosen. When 
the government or society chooses  1 = δ , we obtain  
                                                 
22This will be the government’s preferred outcome, since the δ=1solution yields 
. 2 / ) / (
2
1 α λ
g g EL =   46
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and         0
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α
λ
π π αγ                 (A40) 
irrespective of the value of .
cb λ But if the government and central bank choose  0 = δ  
and 
cb λ =0  respectively, we get 










] ) ˆ ˆ ( [
λ φ
λ π π α γ + −
=                                                       (A41) 
and                    0 EL
cb = .                                                                                        (A42) 
 
There is no guarantee that (A41) is less than (A39), although it is certain if  π π ˆ ˆ
cb →  
and ). 2 /( ) s (
2 2 g
2 φ αγ λ >  Hence the monetary authorities can guarantee their preferred 
solution if the government has a commitment to fiscal sustainability, and if the central 
bank sets its own inflation target close enough to the government’s not to trigger an 
override to  1 = δ . That solution then generates 
cb π π ˆ *= ,  and   
0 / ] ) ˆ ˆ ( [ * 2 1 < − − =
g g cb s E φλ λ π π α γ τ . 
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APPENDIX C: WHEN WILL GOVERNMENTS BLOCK TARGET 
INDEPENDENCE? 
a) Under fiscal leadership, target independence will always be blocked as is evident 
from table 1: 
g EL  is greater using the values in row 5 than using the values in row 3. 
 
b) Under monetary leadership, it will be blocked if the value of (A36) is less than 
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If π π ˆ ˆ →
cb , this inequality holds when 
g g s 2
2
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2 2 2 2
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; and the latter cer-
tainly holds if α < 1. If π π ˆ ˆ <
cb  then the right hand side of the original inequality is 
increased further. 
 
c) Under simultaneous decision making, target independence will be blocked if 
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+ < . 
The exact conditions for this inequality are complicated. Simple sufficient conditions 
are: 
i) 1 1 <
g λ  (because
2 2s γ will be small, 0.02 or less in most cases) when
g
2 λ  is not too 




cb g cb , where 
∗ cb λ is the optimal value of 
cb λ from (10) 
when δ=0;   
(iii) 1 2
2 >
g λ φ ;  or  (iv) )] ( 2 /[ ˆ ˆ 2
2 2 2 2
1
g g cb s λ φ γ α α λ π π + > − . 
For convenience the main text takes the first of these conditions, which requires only 
some commitment to sustainable fiscal policies by the government. Each of these re-
sults has been obtained by inserting the outcomes in table 1 into
g EL  at (4). 